Introduction
In popular literature on new media (Toffler, 1981;  Naisbitt, 1984) . in academic literature on the Information Revolution (Bell, 1979;  Porat, 1978;  Irwin, 1984) . and most significantly in policy documents from the Government of Canada, a recurring heme is evident: technological imperative. the doctrine maintaining that technology's march is largely inevitable, autonomous. foreordained . (Winner, 1977) . In Canada, foremost among proselytizers of the doctrine of technological imperative, have been senior civil servants Shirley Serafini and Michel Andrieu, whose widely-read tome. The Information Revolution and Its Implications for Canada (1981) . declared:
Like the industrial revolution, the information revolution is unavoidable Serafini and Andrieu do not stand alone among the Canadian policy-making elite. Other governmental soothsayers have also endorsed enthusiastically the doctrine of technological inevitability: Arthur J. Cordell (1985) . Francis Fox (1983) . the Telecommission (1971) and the Science Council (1982). among others. This doctrine of the technological imperative, it is to be noted, provides a veneer of inevitability, naturalness, and hence goodness to technological developments and deployment that otherwise might raise questions concerning the distribution of political and economic power, cultural change, environmend impact, investment priorities and so on. Such questions become academic, however, as soon as one subscribes to a docmne of tcchnologicd inevitability. As well the technological imperative neady absolves the of technique of responsibility for outcomes. What is, after all. must be. In this context it is most inslructivc to recall remarks of Roland Barthes, who wrote:
Myth deprives the object of which it speaks of all History. In it, history evaporates ... Nothing is produced, nothing is chosen: all one has to do is possess these new objccts from which all soiling trace of origin or choice has been removed. This miraculous evaporation of all history is another form of a concept common to most bourgeois myths: the irresponsibility of man (Barthes, 1972: 151) .
The present paper endeavours to re-introduce this same "soiling trace of origin or choice". By drawing upon a range of evidence from Canadian telecommunications history, including local and interexchange telcphonc service, cable television and communication satcllitcs, one of the most pernicious myths of our day, namely the technological imperative, is dispelled. The paper dcmonslrates that governmental policy-makers and more particularly corporate powerplayers have been instrumental in shaping Canadian tclccommunications infnsmcture; mere technology has been large1 y passive. Human responsibility for outcomes is hence reasserted.
Telephony: Prior To Regulation
Canadian tclccommunications is currently dominated by one company, Bell Canada. Federally regulated, it was formcrly parent of the Bell Canada Group but in 1983, through a controversial corporate reorganization, became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bcll Canada Entcrpriscs Inc. In 1985 BCE amassed revenues of 513.3 billion Gom a divcrsc may of activities ranging from pipelines to publishing. But at the core of this corporate complex squarely stands one company, Bell Canada, and it is to thc emergence of that corporate entity that we now turn.
Bell Canada (or thc Bcll Telephone Company of Canada as it was then known) was incorporated in 1880 by federal charter on behalf of agents of the National Bell Telephone Company of Boston, Mass. Earlier that year National Bell secured Canadian rights to Alexander Graham Bell's remarkable invention (Pauen, 1926) and So its hegemony in Canada seemed assured. Although the patent was declared void in 1885, for the next 100 years the Charter endured. permitting the Company inter alia to string lines along all public rights of way, thereby constituting an important albeit imperfect insmmcnt for monopolization.
Beginning in 1893 when telephone patents expired in the U.S.A.. helping ~nauyrate an American independent telephone industry (Gabcl, 1969) , Canadian independents started springing up too. Between 1892 and 1905 in Ontario alone some 83 independent came into existence (Grindlay. 1974: 254-305) . They generally relied on U.S. manufacturers for equipment since Bcll and it's manufacturing subsidiary, The h h c r n Electric and Manufacturing Company. were less than enthusiastic purveyors Control of TelephonesJRobert E. Babe of telecommunications equipment to these interlopers. Indecd enuy by independents gave rise to a flurry of anticompetitive activity on the part of Bcll, carefully designed to stall and, if possible, reverse growth of the insurgents. In the case of multiparty rural lines, for example, Bell often granted urban interconnections but only on condition that Bell be affordcd control over all further conncctions; sometimes Bcll interconnected with one company to eliminate connections for others, a ploy to put the latter out of business (House of Commons, 1905: 238-241) . Predatory pricing was well-honed as an anticompetitive tactic also. In communities like Shcrbrooke, Peterborough, Port Arthur and Fort William free service served admirably to h m s s competitors (House of Commons 1905: 77-98, 680) ; in Montreal too prices were shaved to rock bottom as a competitive response.
Beginning in 1891 and continuing until 1909 whcn finally oullawcd by the Board of Railway Commissioncrs for Canada. Bcll secured agreement from major railroads to exclude indepcndents from railway stations and rights of way (House of Commons 1905: 179-209) . Furthermore Bcll procured exclusive franchises from municipalities (30 of them by 1905) by promising not to increase ratcs for the life of the agrccmcnts (House of Commons 1905: 660) . Exclusionary tactics such as Lhcsc, coupled with perceived excessively high ratcs and lack of rural scrvicc, eventually resultdd in the inauguration of federal regulation, beginning in 1906 (Railway Act. S.C.6 Edw. VII, c.42).
Years of Regulation
Among the powers granted the Board of Railway Commissioncrs in 1906 was oversight of connections baween Bcll and other companies. From 1906 to the 1950's the main interconnection issue concerned Bell's relations with predominantly local tclcphone companies. Since the 1950's, howcvcr, interconnection controversies have cmbraced cable television and rival long-distance carriers as well. This section addresses all thesc instances, and also tcrminal interconnection, the attachment of customer-owned ("foreign") tcrminal devices. .
Interconnections With Local Telephone Companies
Between 1906 and 1915 some 676 indcpcndcnt telephone companics were established in Ontario. Growth was so dramatic that by 1915 indcpendcnts accounted for ncarIy one third of Ontario's telephones, a level never since equallcd (Rural Telephone Committee, 1953: Exhibit 2) . Despite regulation, Bcll succeeded in halting, then reversing, the growth of independents, first through long distance interconnection and pricing policies and then subsequently through local exchange pricing policies, ultimately absorbing most of Lhcm. Indecd Bell bought up 160 Ontario independents bctween 1950 and 1959 and an additional 218 bctween 1960 and 1975 (Ontario Telephone Service Commission, 1977 . These takeovers arc explained by noting pricing tactics employed by the carrier and the sequence of rulings handed down by Bell's federal regulator.
From the onset of compctition to the 1920's Bell claimed long distance (toll) %rvice was unprofitable and was being cross-subsidized by local service (see 53 Can. s.C. R. 503,1915) . This contention is supported by noting that pressures for entry at fie time were primarily into local service, not long distance. As long as Bell retained discretion over long distance connections. this pricing strategy made sense. It allowed fie company to retain high local rates despite direct competition. Rivals, after all, were handicapped by having few if any long distance lines. The pricing strategy also dissuaded competitive envy into long distance.
Once Bell was required by its regulator to afford even competing companies connections to long distance however, (Rural Telephone Cos. v. Bell Telephone Co.. 12 Can. Ry. Cas. 319. 1912) . this form of non-compensatory pricing became less expedient. Indeed, Bell found itself in the undesirable position of subsidizing its competition! Consequently, by the turn of the decade. Bell had implemented its fist phase of "rate rebalancing", reversing the losslprofit relationship between long distance and local whereupon independents began to subsidize Bell for their use of long distance. "Rebalancing" reached such immense proponions by 1979 that Bell declarcd its cost to be $1.32 to produce $1.00 in local exchange revenues but only $0.31 to produce $1.00 in toll (CRTC 1979a: 216) .
Phase One "Rebalancing". then, had two consequences as regards the structuring of the telephone industry. First, it creatcd a severe financial strain on indepcndent companies now pressured into charging non compensatory local rates and unable to share (adequately) in toll revenues (CRTC. 1978; 31) . Second, it created incentives for entry into long distance by other carriers. We discuss the rust result immediately, and the second later on in this paper.
Independent telephone companies suffered under the first round of "rate rebalancing". However, since all agreements between Bell and the independents were subject to regulatory approval. the Commissioners of the day played an important role in the demise of independent companies. The record clearly reveals a lack of concern on their part. In a 195 1 decision approving a toll-sharing agreement between Bell and "line haul companies" (companies owning some long distance lines), for example, the Board of Transport Commissioners emphasized that it had "no responsibility for the revenue plight of companies not subject to our jurisdiction" (Board of Transport Commissioners, 1951) . Likewise in 1954 the Board rciteratcd that it was "not responsible for the financial welfare of such companies" (Board of Transport C~mmissioners, 1954) . Here Union Telephone Company, which lacked toll lines of its own, had applied to share more adequately in long distance revenues generated by calls originated by it. Union argued it should at least be compensated for expenses incurred in billing its subscribers and for use of equipment provided by Union which was used jointly for local and toll traffic. The Board, however, in dismissing the application, adopted the so-called "board-to-board" method of cost allocations,
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Control of TelephonesflRobert E. Babe whereby it is assumed that local switching, local distribution and telephone instruments are not used in long distance calls and hcnce wanant no compensation.
Only after 1976, the date when federal jurisdiction over telccommunications \Has transferred to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, did such outrageous rulings get reversed (CRTC, 1979b) . Unfortunately, the new sympathetic treatment by the regulator toward indcpendent tclcphone companiescame many years too late, since most independents had long since passed into oblivion. Nonetheless in Ontario today some 30 independent companies survive, providing in 1985,179,000 of the province's telephones (Ontario Telephone Scrvice Commission, 1986: 13). a-small but persuasive reminder that a substantially different indusby structure could now be in place.
Cable Television Interconnection
Analogous to Bcll's harsh traunentof independent telephone companies has been its interaction with another locally-based tclccommunication industry, h e cable television industry. Although precluded by its chartcr, as amended, from running cable tclcvision systcms, Bell excrtcd effective control ovcr the industry through contractual restrictions, beginning with the inception of the industry in the early 1950's and continuing until 1977. Bcll's interest in restricting cablc is obvious. The mcssage canying capacity of the coaxial cable uscd in cable systems is over 300 times seater than the coppcr pair wire (or local loops) uscd by Bell to conncct the tclcphone instrumcnt to thc local exchange. Unrcstrictcd, cablc systcms could provc to be formidable competition for Bell.
The cable industry since its inception has been dcpendcnt on tclcphone companies for acccss to poles, ducts and rights of way. In ordcr to minimize competitive incursions, Bcll Telephone (and some, but not all other Canadian telephone companies) offered access to poles and ducts only undcr highly restrictive conditions. Under Bell's "partial system agreement" cable companies were required to conmct with Bell to construct their systems; were required to pay for the labour and materials used in construction; and then were required to lease the facilities back from Bell. Bcll, in other words, refused to allow cables owned by cable companies on its poles and ovcr its rights of way (Babe, 1974: 187-225) . Since Bell owned the cable it was also in a position to restrict the types of messages that could bc uansponcd. Typical prohibitions included:
.
(1) preclusion of material not part of, or ancillary to broadcasts or cablecasts;
(2) messages for distribution point-to-point or to only a portion of the network; thereby pay television and certain educational and industrial programming were forbidden; (3) bidirectional messages and conversations; and (4) facilities used in conjunction with, or interconnected to, the telephone switching centre. (Babe, 1974: 209) .
On appeal in 1975, the Canadian Transport Commission (CTC) ruled that one cable company, namely Transvision (Magog) lnc.. should be allowed to attach its own cable to Bell's p0ks (Canadian Transport Commission. 1975a) . Then in 1977. having telecommunications jurisdiction from the CTC, the CRTC passed a general ling whereby licensed cable companies could attach their own cables to Bell's poles (cRTC, 1977a) . Rates for pole attachments since that time have been set by the commission to prevent monopoly pricing. As a result the cable industry in recent years has been offering pay television and some companies are providing alarm, meter reading and other services that had been banned under the "partial system agreement". In the years to come cable television may well become competitive in other services, such as electronic banking and electronic publishing (videotext). It is to be noted that the status of cable vis-a-vis the telephone industry has depended more on regulatory policy and contractual arrangements than upon b e technologies in question.
Terminal Interconnection
A century-old claim undergirding "natural monopoly" in Canadian telecommunications has bcen the notion of systcmic integrity, the belief that network performance could be maintained only through centralized administration of end-to-end operations. By analogy to the weak link in thechain, telephone companies contended that subscriber-owned equipment would pollute the system with malfunctioning equipment. In 1968, however, Parliament reduced Bell's authority to ban subscriber-owned equipment by revising the Bell Charter, empowering the Canadian Transport Commission to become final arbiter regarding the "reasonableness" of Bell's "requirements" for the atlachment of customer-owned equipment.
In 1975 Dr. Morton S hulman, millionaire stock speculator, author, former coroner and maverick M.P.P. in Ontario's Parliament complained lo the CTC that Bell had disconnected his phone in the provincial legislature. Bell countered that Dr. Shulman had illegally attached his own terminal to Bell's line, that Bell had drawn up no "requirements" for such attachment. With impeccable logic the CTC agreed with Bell, ruling that since Bell had published no "requirement" there was "no such requirement before the Commission which the Commission could judge IO be reasonable or not" Thereupon, the case was dismissed, the CTC maintaining "we have no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in the casen (CTC. 1975b Having gone to the trouble to take the stcps to make this service available to the public. Bell Canada quite understandably desires to reap the bcncfits of this ncw offering. (CRTC, 1977b: 15) .
The Commission, while perhaps marvelling at Sanders' candor, nonethcless ruled the tariff to be illegal, conferring as it did unduc prcfercnce and unjust discrimination in Bcll's favour. The decision was subscqucntly ratified, on appcal, by the Fedcral Court of Appeal (Kaiser, 1981) . Rcbuffcd by the courts and regulator alike, Bcll Canada filed an application in November 1979 requesting the CRTC to make a general ruling on the extent to which attachment of customer-owned equipment was in the public intcrcst. During the ensuing hearings ncithcr Bcll nor BC Tcl invokcd the now-outworn shibbolcth of "systemic integrity." Indccd both companics agccd that provisioning of all terminals should hcnccforth bc on a compctitivc basis (CRTC, 1982: 32).
Long Distance Interconnection
As notcd abovc thc fist era of "rate rcbalancing" crcatcd inccntivcs for cntry into long distancc markets by indcpcndcnt carricrs. This section dcscribcs Bcll's relations with lhrcc rival long distancc carricrs: Norlhcrn Tclcphonc Company, CNCP Tclccommunications and Tclcsat Canada.
Northern Telephone Company
In 1964 thc town of Kcnora, which operatcd a municipal tclcphonc systcm and Northcrn Tclcphonc Limited servicing 150 communities or scttlcmcnts in Northcrn Ontario and adjaccnt regions of Qucbcc, jointly applicd for an Ordcr of thc Board of Transport Commissioners to require Bcll Canada to providc thc applicants with toll intcrconncction at Fort William to cnablc Northcrn to transmit long distancc tclcphone calls bctwcen Kcnora and Fort William in place of (or in competition with) Bcll. While the local exchanges and distribution facilities in Fort William wcre owncd by the municipality, Bcll controllcd the toll switching ccntrc and hcncc toll conncctions. In support of its application Northem stated that Bcll Tclcphonc had always ncglcctcd northern regions, noting that cvcn to that timc Bcll still owncd no long distance transmission facilitics bctwecn the two communities, mcrcly leasing circuits from Canadian Pacific Tclcgraphs. Northcrn also swtcd that toll rcvcnucs gcncratcd by approval of the application would cnable it to lower local raws and upgradc scrvicc throughout its sparscly scttlcd territory. The Board, howcvcr, saw things diffcrcntly, ruling that approval of the application would cause a rcvcnuc fall for Bell of bctwccn 5150,000 and $300,000 pcr year, an undesirable occurrcncc in Lhc Board's view. The Board lhcrcupon dcnicd the application staling "thc fact that a competing carricr is to offer more is not a ground for substimting it for the existing carrier" (Board of Transport Commissioncrs. 1964). Bell acquired Northcrn Telephone in 1966.
CNCP Telecommunications
On 14 June 1976, Canadian Pacific Ltd. applied to the CRTC to order Bell Canada to interconnect CP's tclccommunication system to Bell's switching network. For many years CNCP Telecommunications had been offering services competitive to some serviccs of Bcll Canada and the consortium of telephone companies known as the TransCanada Telephone Systcm (TCTS), today called Telecom Canada. However TCTS mcmbers possessed the important advantage of owning and controlling the local switched distribution facilities, agreed by CNCP to be properly monopolized. CNCP therefore faccd a significant competitive disadvantage in being excluded from such facilities. While CNCP was permitted to lcasc local distribution facilities (local loops) on a "ddicatcd" (unswitched, or point to point) basis from TCTS members, enabling CNCP to conncct busincss customcrs with its own offices and to its own long distance network, it w s prohibitcd from intcrconnccting with tclephone switching centrcs and with hosc customer-owncd terminals which wcre in turn connccted to TCTS switching offices. The result was that CNCP was limitcd to providing private line services and the limited amount of switched services that its own switching and distribution tacilitics could handle. Thousands of small businesses were thereby foreclosed from CNCP's offerings sincc thc leasing of dcdicatcd local loops could bc justified only by institutions with high volumcs of tclecommunications mffic.
In weighing argumcnls on both sidcs thc CRTC departed significantly from positions cstablishcd previously by the Canadian Transport Commission and its predecessors. Whcrcas the Board of Transpon Commissioners had asserted that thc Board was "not responsible for the financial welfare" of companies not under its jurisdiction, the CRTC statcd that it was rcquired to take a widc view of its obligations toprotcct thc public interest and that, in particular, it would consider the indirect effects of granting the application upon subscribers to other tclcphone systems, such as those in the Maritimc and Prairie provinces (CRTC, 1979a: 102-5) . Furthcrmorc, the Commission ruled, again in contrast to the prccedcnt established in the Norlhern Telephone case, that CNCP was required to make a prima facie case only, namely that access to Bell's facilities would bc uscful to CNCP, that duplication of such facilities would not bc in the public intercst; and that "no unreasonable technical harm would result from the intcrconncction" (CRTC, 1979a: 127) .
Rcvicwing thc evidence, h e CRTC concluded that Bell had grossly over-stated the revenue erosion cffcct of intcrconncction. The Commission estimated "as an upper h i t " the revcnue loss to BE11 in 1982 from intcrconncction to be no more than $45.7 million, as opposed to the S2.53.3 million Bcll had estimated (CRTC, 1979a: 186, 140) . Furthcrmorc, thc CRTC statcd bat "Bcll failcd to provide adequate empirical evidcncc to support its contentions regarding the nature and extent of any economies
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Control of TelephoneslRobert E. Babe of scale enjoyed by it" (CRTC, 1979a: 241) . On the other hand the Commission foresaw substantial benefits from interconnection. "The evidence in this case indicates that competition would be greatly enhanced with interconnection and that interconnection would provide significant benefits to users in terms of improved responsiveness, particularly on the part of the telephone company, in satisfying their telecommunications requirements" (CRTC, 1979a: 241-2) . Thereupon Bell was ordered to interconnect CNCP for certain private line voice and data transmission services, and a more competitive era was foreseen.
CNCP, however, was unsuccessful in a subsequent application filed in 1983 to extend the range of authorized, interconnected services to include long distance voice, principally Message Toll Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS). Even while applying the criteria used in its previous interconnection decision, the CRTC concluded in this instance that "the granting of CNCP's application would not be in the public interest" (CRTC, 1985: 43) . On the one hand, the CRTC stated, if CNCP were required to make contributions to help Bell maintain low (non-compensatory) local telephone rates, it was unlikcly that CNCP would ever be profitable. On the other hand, if such contributions were not rcquircd, the toll subsidy to local service currently provided by Bell would inevitably dccline due to competitive pricing of toll, resulting in an undue escalation in local rates. Low local rates had, in the years subsequent to being introduced to eliminate independent telephone companies, becomea matter of social policy to foster universal telephone service. This dcsinble goal notwithstanding, it may be noted that Bell used this second CNCP proceeding to advance its proposal to once more "rebalance rates", this time by sharply reducing long distance prices to erase incentives for long distance entry, and by doubling local rates. Bell estimated the effect of phase two "rcbalancing" could bc to deprive 400,000 of its customers of local telephone scrvice (Canadian hcss, 1983: 2) .
Telesat Canada
Turning finally to Telesat Canada, it becomes again apparent that technology per se has dictated no panicular market structure. Telesat Canada was crated by Act of Parliament in 1969, an outcome of recommendations contained in the White Paper on Domestic SateUite Comrnunicarions System for Canada (1 968). In rejecting proposals by TCTS to themselves own, control and finance satellites as part of an integra~d. tcrrestrial/space telecommunications system the While Paper took the position that satellites should be able "to compete effectively in those areas where competition is appropriate". The government also rejected proposals by TCTS that the member companies own all ground stations, a proposal designed to afford the telcos effective control (Dalfcn, 1969) . A further suggestion, that Telesat sell services only t desipatcd common carriers, that is that Telesat become a "carriers'canier", was also rejcclcd.
Nonaheless, the government needed the co-operation of TCTS, anticipating that the telephone companies would be ~e l e k t ' s largest customers. Therefore the government agreed to TCTS's demands that Telesat be allowed to lease only full RF channels, each with a capacity of 960 telephone circuits or one TV channel; that all leases be for continuous use; that five-year leases would be required; and that resale and/or sharing of channels by and among customers be prohibited (Golden, 1974) . These restrictions each reduced Telesat's potential customer base to the carriers themselves and the CBC; the latter, as a crown corporation, was envisaged by the government as helping to keep Telesat afloat during the initial years.
Upon incorpontion of Telesat the government and the carriers each subscribed to fifty percent of the shares with the possibility of allowing the general public to participate to the extent of one-thud ownership at a future date. Between 1972 and 1976 three Anik "A" satellites were launched in the 4-6 GHz range; a fourth Anik "B" satellite, leased full-time to the Department of Communications, was also sent aloft; it operated in the 12-14 GHz range. While the three Anik "A" satellites had 12 transponders each. by 1976 Telesat found itself able to leaqe only one third of its capacity (CRTC, 1977b) . Even the few channels that were leased were underutilized. Telesat was financially ~roubled, despite the public funding through CBC and Department of Communications. Morcover by 1975 there was some question whether TCTS would renew leases unless members could get full control over Telesat.
In these circumstances, Telesat and TCTS reached agreement whereby Telesat would become a member of the telephone consortium and in so doing would receive a guaranteed rate of return. In exchange Telesat agreed that earth stations would henceforth be operated by TCTS members and that Telesat would become a carriers' carrier, selling only to designated carriers. The agreement was approved hastily by the Department of Communications and was submitted for approval to the CRTC in early 1977. In rejecting the agreement the CRTC made the following observations. among others: (1) the guaranteed me of return provision would make assessment of Telesat's rates difficult and would erode incentives for efficiency; (2) the agreement minimized advantages of satellite compared to terrestrial microwave since all facilities Would be bundled together in setting distance-based prices; (3) there was likelihood of undue preference in favour of thc telephone companies to the disadvantage of other carriers such as CNCP; and (4) there was a substantial lessening of competition.
On appeal, Cabinet however overturned the CRTC's decision (Department of C~mmunications, 1977) . The main reason cited for this reversal was that without the agreement the carriers were not expected to utilizeTelesat toany great extent, throwing into question the future financial viability of satellites in Canada. Nonetheless the government did announce that the matter of earth station ownership and Telesat's Policies of leasing only complete channels would be reviewed. 
Conclusions
By investigating closcly pricing and interconnection arrangements in the Canadian telecommunications industry since 1880, one is smck by the widc range of conceivable induslry structures that the various technologies have permitted. Telephones at one time wcre competitive at the local level; predatory pricing and long distance interconnection restrictions, however, eventually eliminated thatcompctition. A thriving independent telephone industry at one time exisled, but an inability to share adequately in toll revenues, plus a smtegy iniliated by the dominant company of pricing local service below cost, all but eliminated the independent industry. Cable television, an allemalive local distribution network, was at one time effectively controlled by the telephone industry. Regulatory rulings outlawing certain restrictive clauses in agreements between the two industries have in more recent years positioned cable to expand significantly the range of services offered the public. Telephone companies once enjoyed end-to-end monopolies. Attachment of customer-owned equipmcnt, a commonplace today, was made possible only through court rulings and regulatory dccisions. Although satellites were originally intended by the government to bc distinct from the telephone industry, upon inception this technology was absorbed within the old industrial order. More recently, regulatory rulings may be freeing satellite from this grip and separating it as an alternative long haul canier.
The histories of the relationship between Northern Telephone and CNCP on the one hand and the telephone indusuy on the other, also point to the variations in market structure that the technologies have permitted. These arc important points to remember in an era in which the shrill cry of the technological imperative is heard so often.
